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ANALYTICAL NIGHTMARE: THE MATERIALLY
ADVERSE ACTION REQUIREMENT IN DISPARATE
TREATMENT CASES
Esperanza N. Sanchez
In his greatest written work,1 “Letter from Birmingham Jail,” Dr. Martin
Luther King Jr. argued that two types of laws existed—those that are just and
those that are unjust.2 Quoting Saint Augustine, he added that “an unjust law is
no law at all,” describing an unjust law as any code that is “out of harmony with
the moral law.”3 He denounced all segregation statutes because such laws
“distorted the soul and damaged the personality,” explaining that any law which
degrades human personality is unjust.4
Dr. King wrote this letter in response to a statement issued in the Birmingham
News by eight white clergymen criticizing the massive desegregation campaign
led by Dr. King in the spring of 1963.5 The desegregation campaign, which later
became known as the Birmingham Campaign of 1963,6 is credited as the catalyst
for the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Civil Rights Act)7 —one of the most important
pieces of legislation enacted in the twentieth century.8 The Birmingham
Campaign, which faced opposition from well beyond the eight clergymen,9 was


J.D. 2018, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law. The author would
like to thank her mentors Eden Brown Gaines and Nicole C. Dillard for their invaluable guidance
and support throughout this process. The author is also grateful to her colleagues at the Catholic
University Law Review for their assistance in preparing this Note for publication.
1. David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Kennedy, King, Shuttlesworth and Walker: The Events
Leading to the Introduction of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 645, 662–63 (1995)
(“That essay, the Letter from Birmingham Jail, is widely regarded as Dr. King’s greatest written
work, and the most important statement of principles of the civil rights era.”).
2. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail, reprinted in 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
835, 840 (1993).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. White Clergymen Urge Local Negroes to Withdraw from Demonstrations, BIRMINGHAM
NEWS, Apr. 13, 1963, at 2.
6. Oppenheimer, supra note 2, at 654.
7. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.); John F. Kennedy, Special Message to the Congress on Civil Rights and Job
Opportunities - June 19, 1963, 1963 Pub. Papers 483, 483 (1963) (“[T]he events in Birmingham
and elsewhere have so increased the cries for equality that no city or State or legislative body can
prudently choose to ignore them.”).
8. Oppenheimer, supra note 2, at 645.
9. See generally TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS
1954–63 (1988). The Birmingham Campaign began on April 3, 1963, as a campaign against local
businesses, where small groups of protesters would stage sit-ins at local lunch counters and dress
shops, but support for the movement was dismal. Local African-American-run media outlets
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a massive, non-violent civil disobedience campaign led by Dr. King to oppose
the immorality of segregation laws in the American South.10 Dr. King believed
that only by personally confronting segregation—at the expense of his own
safety and liberty—could the world be forced to behold its immorality and
change its laws and customs of inequality.11
In the wake of the Birmingham Campaign, President Kennedy sent a message
to Congress urging legislative action to address the “growing moral crisis in
American race relations.”12 This moral call to action led to the longest debate
in the Senate’s history to that point, testing the legislators’ attitudes of justice
and equality.13 Despite considerable Republican opposition,14 Congress
eventually passed the Civil Rights Act on July 2, 1964, and President Lyndon B.
Johnson signed into law two days later.15

treated the campaign as a “disturbing rumor and provided no firsthand coverage of the
demonstrations,” while local white publications regarded both the segregationists and Dr. King as
“blemishes on the civic reform movement.” Id. at 710.
10. In the wake of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the landmark decision
that prohibited segregation in public schools, a new civil rights leadership emerged due to the
narrow scope and painfully slow enforcement of the court-ordered desegregation. This new
leadership, which included Dr. King, consisted of preachers who were “more militant and less
dependent on the middle class” than the leading mainstream black civil rights organization, the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and who believed that the
path to equality could only be paved by non-violent confrontation rather than lobbying and
litigation. Oppenheimer, supra note 2, at 647–48.
11. The integration process “prescribed by Brown” failed to materialize in any meaningful
way due to violent resistance by southern segregationists. See MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY
WE CAN’T WAIT 5–7 (1964) (“Yet the statistics make it abundantly clear that the segregationists
of the South remained undefeated by the decision.”). After almost a decade of waiting for progress,
Dr. King and other leaders of the civil rights movement decided that the time for direct action had
come and chose Birmingham, which was regarded as having the “most implacable segregationists
in the country,” as the stage for a massive, non-violent civil disobedience campaign that would
confront the realities of segregation in the South. Id. at 37–59; accord Oppenheimer, supra note 2,
at 659 (“The rigid segregation of Birmingham was held together by both the power of segregation
laws and the power of racist violence . . . . During the period between 1957 and 1962 there were
between sixteen to twenty reported bombings in Birmingham of black churches and civil rights
leaders’ homes.”).
12. Kennedy, supra note 8, at 483 (“[T]he events in Birmingham and elsewhere have so
increased the cries for equality that no city or State or legislative body can prudently choose to
ignore them.”). He called on Congress to enact comprehensive civil rights law that would provide
“the most responsible, reasonable, and urgently needed” solutions to the civil unrest. Id. at 484.
He implored, “Justice requires us to insure the blessings of liberty for all Americans and their
posterity—not merely for reasons of economic efficiency, world diplomacy, and domestic
tranquility—but, above all, because it is right.” Id. at 494.
13. See Marjorie Hunter, History of Bill: A Year of Words, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 1964),
http://www.nytimes.com/1964/06/20/history-of-bill-a-year-of-words.html; see also 110 CONG.
REC. 14,443, 14,443 (1964) (statement of Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey).
14. Llewellyn E. Thompson II, The Civil Rights Act of 1964: Present at Its Birth, 29 U.S.F.
L. REV. 681, 681–82 (1995).
15. Thompson, supra note 15, at 690.

Summer 2018]

Analytical Nightmare

577

One of the most controversial provisions of the Civil Rights Act was the fair
employment provision known as Title VII.16 Opponents argued that Title VII
was an unconstitutional extension of federal regulatory authority in the private
enterprise of employment.17 Those in favor of Title VII rejected any claims of
unconstitutionality, calling to the Chamber’s attention the purpose and urgent
need for such legislation.18 Addressing the divide, one senator proclaimed:
“Two centuries ago, we initiated an experiment in popular freedom. A century
ago, we emphasized that we meant it to be freedom for everyone, but the
realization has been retarded.”19
In the years following the Civil War and Reconstruction, African Americans
were routinely denied access to employment, and when they did work, they were
unabashedly underpaid.20 The subsequent Jim Crow Era perpetuated this pattern
of employment discrimination as a form of government-sanctioned racial
oppression.21 “These segregation statutes thrived in the South for almost a
century, . . .” immorally excluding African Americans and other minority groups
from equal opportunity in all aspects of life, including employment.22 Congress
prescribed Title VII to cure the evils that stemmed from decades of oppression
perpetuated by unjust segregation statutes.23
However, employment discrimination continues, despite the enactment of
Title VII, but often in subtler forms.24 Federal courts have struggled to—and in
some instances refused to—adapt to increasingly covert forms of
discrimination.25 Over the last fifty years, lower federal courts have interpreted
16. Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e).
17. 110 CONG. REC. 14,318, 14,319 (1964) (statement of Sen. Barry M. Goldwater); see also
110 CONG. REC. 14,318, 14,318 (1964) (statement of Sen. John J. Sparkman); 110 CONG. REC.
14,507, 14,507 (1964) (statement of Sen. James Strom Thurmond).
18. 110 CONG. REC. 14,448, 14,449 (1964) (statement of Sen. Paul Douglas) (“This bill is a
work of love, not hate; a measure to help people surmount prejudice and not to marshal the law
behind prejudice. It is a measure to furnish a standard beyond which individuals can go but below
which they cannot fall.”).
19. 110 CONG. REC. 14,276, 14,276 (1964) (statement of Sen. John Pastore).
20. ROY L. BROOKS ET AL., THE LAW OF DISCRIMINATION: CASES AND PERSPECTIVES 431
(2011).
21. Today, job segregation and pay differential remain as the “dominant form[s] of
employment discrimination for all minorities.” Id.
22. See David Pilgrim, What Was Jim Crow, JIM CROW MUSEUM (2012),
http://www.ferris.edu/jimcrow/what.htm.
23. See 110 CONG. REC. 14,443, 14,443 (1964) (statement of Sen. Jack Javits) (“[F]or the
first time in recent history the Congress of the United States will say in clear and unmistakable
terms: ‘There is no room for second-class citizenship in our country.’ Let no one doubt the historical
significance of this ringing affirmation which we now deliver to the Nation and to the World.”).
24. See BROOKS, supra note 21, at 431 (“No longer does one encounter signs in store windows
that read ‘Latinos need not apply’ or company rules that outright bar African American employees
from being promoted. Employment discrimination today is far more complex.”).
25. See, e.g., Rosalie Berger Levinson, Parsing the Meaning of “Adverse Employment
Action” in Title VII Disparate Treatment, Sexual Harassment, and Retaliation Claims: What
Should Be Actionable Wrongdoing?, 56 OKLA. L. REV. 623, 624 (2003) (“Unfortunately, when
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the statutory language of Title VII so narrowly that legislative intervention has
been warranted on multiple occasions.26 To illustrate the cyclical struggle
between the legislature and the judiciary, one need look no further than the
evolution of the disparate treatment theory.27
Under Title VII, an employer is barred from discriminating against an
individual based on that individuals “race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.”28 Courts interpret this language as requiring a plaintiff prove two things:
(1) the employer had an impermissible motive to discriminate; and (2) the
employer took some adverse employment action against him.29 Although the
“adverse employment action” requirement is not found in the statutory language,
courts have imported this requirement into Title VII jurisprudence, without
clearly defining which employment actions qualify as “adverse.”30 This lack of
clarity has resulted in analytical confusion, yielding anemic anti-discrimination
protections that, in effect, shelter invidious employment practices from
liability.31 Yet, such an untenable result squarely contradicts both the letter and
spirit of Title VII.
In the D.C. Circuit, for example, the employment discrimination plaintiff must
show that the challenged action was “materially adverse” to his employment.32
Actions leading to termination, diminution in pay, or demotion from supervisory
roles present glaring examples of material adversity. However, the law is not as
clear in actions involving more subtle changes in employment, such as the denial
of a lateral transfer.
This Note explores the current analytical confusion generated by the adverse
employment action requirement in disparate treatment cases. Part I establishes
the foundation for this discussion by first outlining the operative statutory
language. The discussion then identifies the two judicially imported
discrimination takes on more subtle, less tangible forms, courts have faltered in enforcing Title
VII’s goal of achieving equal employment opportunity.”).
26. See Henry L. Chambers, Reading Amendments and Expansions of Title VII Narrowly, 95
B.U. L. REV. 781, 783–84 (2015); see also Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the
Separation of Powers: Statutory Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 511, 514–15 (2009) (discussing how federal courts continue to use precedents that
amendments to Title VII are meant to address).
27. Title VII § 703(a) outlines two types of unlawful employment practices, with each one
requiring distinct burdens, but this Note will focus on the disparate treatment theory governed by
section 703(a)(1) as opposed to the disparate impact theory of section 703(a)(2). Pub. L. 88-352,
78 Stat. 255 (1964) (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2). For an in-depth discussion of
the modern disparate impact theory, see Reva B. Siegel, Race-Conscious but Race-Neutral: The
Constitutionality of Disparate Impact in the Roberts Court, 66 ALA. L. REV. 653 (2014).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
29. See infra Section I.B.
30. See infra Section I.B.2.
31. See Nancy Gertner, Losers’ Rules, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109, 109 (2012) (“Changes in
substantive discrimination law since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were tantamount
to a virtual repeal. This was not so because of Congress; it was because of judges.”).
32. Dudley v. Wash. Metro Area Transit Auth., 924 F. Supp. 2d. 141, 153 (D.D.C. 2013).
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components for a disparate treatment claim, followed by an examination of some
factors that have led to the analytical inconsistencies surrounding the adverse
employment action requirement in lower federal courts. Part II analyzes a
curious case out of the District of Columbia Circuit, to illustrate how antidiscrimination jurisprudence has created an analytical nightmare for jurists. Part
III explains how, far too often, the confusion has resulted in a court-sanctioned
barrier to the Civil Rights Act’s promise of equal opportunity.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ADVERSE EMPLOYMENT ACTION
A.

The Word and Spirit of Title VII

Both the Supreme Court and the circuit courts have recognized Title VII’s
goal of eliminating discrimination in the workplace.33 Yet, employment
discrimination decisions by the federal courts have created a body of law that
patently contradicts Title VII’s aim of equal employment opportunity.34 To
explore such a development, one must first examine the substantive prohibitions
outlined in the statutory language.
Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII renders an employment practice unlawful if an
employer “discriminate[s] against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”35 Section 703(a)(2)
renders an employment practice unlawful if an employer “limit[s], segregate[s],
or classif[ies] his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
33. See e.g., Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 342 (2013) (“Title VII is
central to the federal policy of prohibiting wrongful discrimination in the Nation’s workplaces and
in all sectors of economic endeavor.”); McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352,
358 (1995) (positing that the ADEA and Title VII share the “common purpose [of] eliminati[ng]
discrimination in the workplace”); EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 77 (1984) (“The dominant
purpose of [Title VII], of course, is to root out discrimination in employment.”); Kremer v. Chem.
Constr. Corp., 546 U.S. 461, 468 (1982) (“Congress enacted Title VII to assure equality of
employment opportunities without distinction with respect to race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.”); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973) (“[I]t is abundantly clear
that Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise.”); Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (“What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and
unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the
basis of racial or other impermissible classification.”).
34. See Marcia L. McCormick, Let’s Pretend that Federal Courts Aren’t Hostile to
Discrimination Claims, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. FURTHERMORE 22, 28–29 (2015) (criticizing federal
courts for, among other things, downplaying the importance of evidence such as blatantly racist
and sexist speech that a reasonable jury would think is indicative of employment discrimination);
see generally Henry L. Chambers, The Supreme Court Chipping Away at Title VII: Strengthening
It or Killing It?, 74 LA. L. REV. 1161 (2014); Widiss, supra note 27, at 514–15; Levinson, supra
note 26, at 623–24; accord Rebecca Hanner White, De Minimis Discrimination, 47 EMORY L.J.
1121 (1998) (criticizing federal courts for permitting employers to commit “benign” discrimination
against employees in contradiction of the spirit of Title VII).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
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status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.”36 Although, Title VII’s unequivocal prohibition of workplace
discrimination based on protected characteristics is clear from the plain language
of the statute, determining what constitutes discrimination is left to the courts.37
Two theories of discrimination exist under Title VII: disparate treatment and
disparate impact.38 Disparate treatment, which constitutes the focus of this Note,
is the most easily understood type of discrimination—the employer intentionally
“treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.”39 Disparate impact cases involve “facially
neutral policies or practices, which, in operation, affect one group more harshly
than another without the justification of a business necessity.”40 Ultimately, the
distinguishing factor between the two theories of discrimination is the presence
of intent.41
B.

Disparate Treatment Theory

The compelling interest in extinguishing invidious employment practices
aimed at racial minorities guided early judicial interpretations of Title VII,
resulting in a broad reading of the statutory language.42 In the half century since
its passage, however, federal courts have moved toward an increasingly narrow
reading of the statutory language, thereby imposing heavier burdens on
aggrieved plaintiffs to weed out cases.43 Thus, this discussion turns to a brief
overview of the evolution of the modern disparate treatment theory in federal
courts.

36. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
37. See id. § 2000e.
38. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See White, supra note 34, at 1131–32.
42. See e.g., Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (“We must be acutely
conscious of the fact that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 should be accorded a liberal
interpretation in order to effectuate the purpose of Congress to eliminate the inconvenience,
unfairness, and humiliation of ethnic discrimination.”); Roberts v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 337 F. Supp.
1055, 1056 (N.D. Ohio 1971) (“[G]reat perspicacity is not required to realize that the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 negates an employer’s right to discriminate, classify, or otherwise make rules which
are based upon race, religion, sex or national origin.” (emphasis added)).
43. See, e.g., Nichols v. S. Ill. Univ.-Edwardsville, 510 F. Supp. 772, 779 (7th Cir. 2007)
(requiring a “materially adverse employment action” to assert a disparate treatment claim to prevent
‘minor and even trivial employment actions’ from becoming the basis of such claims) (citations
omitted); Stewart v. Evans, 275 F.3d 1126, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“[N]ot all abusive behavior,
even when it is motivated by discriminatory animus, is actionable.”). Although the need for a
sustainability threshold is reasonable, critics have pointed out that any standard that permits
discrimination violates both the word and spirit of Title VII, arguing that questions regarding the
magnitude of the discrimination should “be addressed at the remedial stage” rather than foreclosing
claims altogether. See White, supra note 34, at 1163–64, accord Levinson, supra note 26, at 636.
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Disparate treatment discrimination may involve a single employee (individual
disparate treatment) or affect numerous employees concurrently (systemic
disparate treatment).44 The scope of this Note will center on individual disparate
treatment, exploring what a plaintiff must show to prove an employer violated
Section 703(a)(1).45 Because “simply treat[ing] some people less favorably than
others” on the basis of a protected characteristic will render an employer’s
actions unlawful, disparate treatment claims under Section 703(a)(1) require two
components: (1) an impermissible motivation and (2) less favorable treatment.46
1.

Discriminatory Intent: Showing the Impermissible Motivation

The Supreme Court’s first articulated legal standard for disparate treatment
cases emerged nine years after the passage of Title VII in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green.47 Due to the inherent challenges of showing discriminatory
intent,48 the Court took a process-of-elimination approach to proving
discrimination and laid out a three-step analysis that would eliminate “the most
common nondiscriminatory reasons” for the challenged conduct.49
First, the plaintiff must show a prima facie case of discrimination by creating
an inference of an employer’s discriminatory motive.50 The inference of
discrimination arises out of the presumption that the challenged conduct, if
otherwise unexplained, is “more likely than not based on the consideration of
impermissible factors.”51 Once the plaintiff makes the prima facie case, the
burden shifts to the defendant to “clearly set forth, through the introduction of
admissible evidence, the [legitimate, nondiscriminatory] reasons for the
plaintiff’s rejection.”52 If the defendant carries its burden, “[t]he plaintiff must
be given the opportunity to introduce evidence that the proffered justification is
merely a pretext for discrimination.”53
44. See BROOKS, supra note 21, at 481.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
46. See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52 (2003).
47. 411 U.S. 792, 802–03 (1973) (involving a black civil rights activist who filed suit against
his former employer, alleging racial discrimination when his employer rejected his application for
rehire).
48. See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.8 (1981) (“In a Title VII
case, the allocation of burdens and the creation of a presumption by the establishment of a prima
facie case is intended progressively to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question of
intentional discrimination.”).
49. Id. at 252–54.
50. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The Court later fleshed out the McDonnell Douglas
four-prong prima facie test for employment discrimination cases by requiring only that a plaintiff
create an inference of an employer’s discriminatory motive. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977) (explaining that the McDonnell Douglas prima facie standard
demands that a plaintiff “create an inference that the [employer’s] decision was a discriminatory
one”).
51. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
52. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 (explaining the McDonnell Douglas paradigm).
53. See Furnco Constr. Corp., 438 U.S. at 578.
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The Court refined the McDonnell Douglas paradigm in Texas Department of
Community Affairs v. Burdine. Because the ultimate burden of persuasion
“remains with the plaintiff at all times,” the Burdine Court held that the
defendant only bears a burden of production in proffering a nondiscriminatory
reason for the challenged conduct.54 Burdine reinforced the principle that, at the
preliminary stages of a disparate treatment claim, the defendant’s burden is far
lower than the plaintiff’s burden. Moreover, once the defendant produced a
nondiscriminatory reason for its action, the burden returned to the plaintiff to
show pretext.55
Delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Powell added that, once a
discrimination claim reached the pretext phase of the analysis, a plaintiff may
demonstrate pretext by discrediting the employer’s proffered explanation.56
Consequently, in the wake of Burdine, many lower federal courts interpreted the
plaintiff’s burden of persuasion as satisfied if the plaintiff disproved the
defendant’s proffered explanation.57 For these courts, the plaintiff proved her
case as a matter of law whenever she simply disproved the employer’s proffered
justifications for the challenged action.58
However, the Court rejected this view in St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks.59
In an ardent opinion by Justice Scalia, Hicks held that merely discrediting the
employer’s reason as pretext fails to satisfy the plaintiff’s ultimate burden of
persuasion; thus, the plaintiff must show “both that the reason was false, and
that discrimination was the real reason.”60 Hicks stood for the proposition that,
coupled with the prima facie case, proof of pretext allowed the factfinder to draw
the inference that the employer’s conduct was motivated by some impermissible
factor, but did not necessarily prove “a pretext for discrimination.”61
Subsequently, lower federal courts read the Hicks decision as requiring a
“pretext-plus” rule, where the plaintiff must produce evidence to make the prima
facie case plus provide additional, independent evidence of discrimination.62 As

54. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 (reversing the Fifth Circuit decision for applying a burden of
persuasion—rather than a burden of production—in their McDonnell Douglas analysis).
55. Id. at 255–56.
56. Id. at 256 (“She may succeed in this either directly or by persuading the court that a
discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the
employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804–05 (1973)).
57. See, e.g., Williams v. Valentec Kisco, Inc., 964 F.2d 723, 728 (8th Cir. 1992)
(“Nonetheless, Burdine clearly does not support a pretext-plus approach. We reject Valentec
Kisco’s contention that Williams had to both discredit its stated reason for firing him and prove
that age was a determining factor in Valentec Kisco’s decision.”).
58. Id. at 728–29.
59. 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993).
60. Id. at 515.
61. Id. at 515–16 (emphasis added).
62. See, e.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 197 F.3d 688, 692 (1999).

Summer 2018]

Analytical Nightmare

583

a result, many disparate treatment plaintiffs could not survive summary
judgment under the Hicks’ pretext-plus rule.63
The Supreme Court, however, flatly rejected the pretext-plus standard in
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products.64 In applying the Title VII burdenshifting paradigm to an Age Discrimination Employment Act (ADEA) claim,
Justice O’Connor relied on the analysis in Hicks to reiterate that circumstantial
evidence arising from the prima facie case and paired with the factfinder’s
disbelief of the employer’s proffered reason permits a finding of impermissible
discrimination.65 In effect, Reeves emphasized the probative value of
circumstantial evidence at the pre-trial stage and highlighted possible inferences
that could be drawn from it.66 In other words, when questions of intent rely
almost exclusively on circumstantial evidence, reasonable minds could differ as
to the weight of the evidence. These cases, therefore, warrant a trial, where the
merits of the case can be litigated.
2.

Less Favorable Treatment: The Adverse Employment Action

Courts have imported the requirement of an adverse employment action into
the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” language of Section
703(a)(1).67 Early on, in Hishon v. King and Spalding, the Supreme Court
recognized the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” clause as an
expansive concept, encompassing any benefits that result from an employment
relationship.68 The Court elaborated that those benefits, which comprise the
“incidents of employment,” could not be “afforded in any manner contrary to
Title VII.”69 Just two years later, in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, the
Court rejected the notion that Title VII was limited to “economic” or “tangible”
discrimination.70 Rather, the Court opined that “[t]he phrase ‘terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment’ evinces a congressional intent ‘to strike at the
entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in employment.’”71
But, by the late 1980s, lower federal courts began referring to actions that alter
the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” as “adverse employment
63. See Natasha T. Martin, Pretext in Peril, 75 MO. L. REV. 313, 331 (2010).
64. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 146 (“In so reasoning, the Court of Appeals misconceived the
evidentiary burden borne by plaintiffs who attempt to prove intentional discrimination through
indirect evidence.”).
65. Id. at 146–47.
66. See Martin, supra note 63, at 331–33.
67. See Ernest F. Lidge III, The Meaning of Discrimination: Why Courts Have Erred in
Requiring Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs to Prove that the Employer’s Action Was
Materially Adverse or Ultimate, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 333, 347 (1999).
68. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 75 (1984) (“A benefit that is part and parcel of
the employment relationship may not be doled out in a discriminatory fashion, even if the employer
would be free under the employment contract simply not to provide the benefit at all.”).
69. Id.
70. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
71. Id.
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actions,” and this term of art evolved into a judicially constructed substantive
requirement despite its absence from the statutory language.72 Today, the
plaintiff alleging disparate treatment must show not only that her employer
altered the “terms, conditions, or privileges of [her] employment” based on some
protected characteristic, but also that such a change resulted in a sufficiently
adverse consequence.73
Although every jurisdiction requires an adverse employment action to seek a
remedy under Section 703(a)(1), the circuits are split as to what degree of
adversity is sufficient to make an employment action justiciable.74 The D.C.
Circuit, for example, requires a “materially adverse” standard,75 while the Fifth
Circuit requires that the employment action be “ultimate” in nature.76 In seeking
to determine which employment actions are actionable, the lower federal courts
have aggressively narrowed the scope of the “terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment” provision.77 As a result, an inconsistent and confusing disparatetreatment jurisprudence emerged.78
Today, the lower federal courts continue to parse the jurisdiction-specific
standards for adverse employment actions, thereby imposing increasingly higher
burdens on disparate-treatment plaintiffs.79 Regardless of whether the
employment action need be “ultimate” in nature or “materially adverse,” these
72. See Lidge, supra note 67, at 346–47; see, e.g.,Green v. Adm’rs of the Tulane Educ. Fund,
284 F.3d 642, 657 (5th Cir. 2002) (requiring an ultimate employment action); Brown v. Brody, 199
F.3d 446, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (requiring a “materially adverse” employment action).
73. See, e.g., Abuan v. Level 3 Commc’ns, Inc. 353 F.3d 1158, 1174 (10th Cir. 2003)
(“[C]onduct constitutes adverse employment action under [Title VII] when it results in a significant
change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with
significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.”).
74. The Supreme Court has yet to define a standard for the purported adverse action
requirement under Section 703(a)(1).
75. See, e.g., Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 446, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
76. See, e.g., Green v. Adm’rs of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 284 F.3d 642, 657 (5th Cir. 2002)
(“Adverse employment actions include only ultimate employment decisions such as hiring,
granting leave, discharging, promoting, or compensating.”). For an in-depth discussion on the
origins of the “ultimate employment decision” standard, see Lidge, supra note 67, at 358–66.
77. See White, supra note 34, at 1151–54. Some circuits have considered that some actions,
although not ultimate in nature, may still have a substantial impact on an employee if such actions
are made in a discriminatory manner. See, e.g., Beyer v. Cty. of Nassau, 524 F.3d 160, 165 (2d Cir.
2008) (requiring a dignity approach in which a discriminatory denial of transfer to materially more
advantageous job is actionable); Grayson v. City of Chi., 317 F.3d 745, 749 (7th Cir. 2003)
(“Because [the plaintiff’s] position at the time of the hiring decisions was identical in all but title
to the position he was denied, rejecting his application for promotion was not a materially adverse
employment action.”). However, the parsing of what constitutes a “materially adverse action” has
added to the analytical confusion. See Levinson, supra note 26, at 636.
78. 1 CHARLES A. SULLIVAN & LAUREN M. WALTER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
AND PRACTICE 59 (4th ed., 2009).
79. See Levinson, supra note 26, at 636; Gertner, supra note 32, at 110 (“It is hard to imagine
a higher bar or one less consistent with the legal standards developed after the passage of the Civil
Rights Act, let alone with the way discrimination manifests itself in the twenty-first century.”).
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burdens have, in operation, created a safe harbor for invidious discrimination.80
As the case study below will show, this trend has whittled the protections of
Title VII to an untenable point. Accordingly, this discussion now turns to
explore possible factors bearing on the judiciary that have led to this
phenomenon.
C. Factors on the Judiciary
Legal scholars in federal anti-discrimination law agree that any discrimination
based on a protected trait contradicts the word and spirit of Title VII.81 Yet,
courts continue to chip away at the protections provided by the statute through
an aggressively narrow reading of the language.82 Despite legislative
intervention to counter the narrowing, the practice of increasing the plaintiff’s
burden continues.83 Legal scholars have noted the problem and offered
solutions.84 Similarly, members of the federal bench have acknowledged the
alarming trend and offered insight into the cause of this phenomenon.85
Federal courts have, in some measure, interpreted Title VII “virtually,
although not entirely, out of existence.”86 Indeed, studies show that employment

80. See id. at 631–32 (“Indeed, many courts are sending a message to employers and their
supervisors that they can discriminate with impunity, provided that their conduct does not reach a
particularly egregious or materially adverse level.”).
81. See Chambers, supra note 34, at 1191 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s interpretations
of Title VII in several cases contradict Title VII’s expansive view); Levinson, supra note 26, at
632–37 (arguing that requirements of material adversity imposed by lower federal courts do not
have any support in either Title VII’s language or in the Supreme Court’s decisions regarding Title
VII); Lidge, supra note67, at 373–75 (arguing that requirements for “adverse, materially adverse,
or ultimate” employment actions contradict the “breathtakingly simple” language of Title VII);
White, supra note34, at 1191 (arguing that, at most, courts should consider the adversity of an
employment action to infer an unlawful motive behind the action, but should ultimately find
adversity “irrelevant” when they determine that there was an unlawful motive).
82. See McCormick, supra note 34, at 25–26 (noting that Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has
repeatedly criticized the Supreme Court for “parsimonious[ly]” interpreting Title VII and
“warp[ing]” its meaning); Chambers, supra note 34, at 1165–66 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s
decisions have enabled employers to structure their activities so as to technically avoid violating
Title VII despite discriminating against their employees).
83. See McCormick, supra note 34, at 25–26 (describing the absurd cycle of Congress having
to amend its anti-discrimination statutes in response to the federal courts’ inevitable attempts to
narrow the statutes’ impact); Chambers, supra note 27, at 781–82; Widiss, supra note 27, at 536–
41 (attributing the lack of analytical clarity regarding Title VII to the tension resulting from the
federal courts’ insistence on following precedents of which Congress has shown disapproval
through various amendments of Title VII).
84. See, e.g., McCormick, supra note 34, at 31 (calling for more judicial education);
Chambers, supra note 27, at 781–82 (recommending careful legislative intervention that is
cognizant of how the federal courts will react).
85. See, e.g., Gertner, supra note 32, at 116–23.
86. Nancy Gertner, The Judicial Repeal of the Johnson/Kennedy Administration’s
“Signature” Achievement 1 (Mar. 9, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=24
06671.
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discrimination plaintiffs fare significantly worse in federal court than plaintiffs
in any other substantive area of federal law.87 Scholars cite this phenomenon as
evidence of judicial hostility toward employment discrimination plaintiffs.88
Some members of the federal bench, however, attribute the plight of the
employment discrimination plaintiff to unintended consequences of pre-trial
procedural rulings.89 Others point to an ideology of conservatism against the
anti-discrimination plaintiff as the reason for this phenomenon.90
1.

Judicial Hostility Toward the Anti-Discrimination Plaintiff

Many scholars have interpreted the increasing burden imposed on antidiscrimination plaintiffs by federal courts as a judicial hostility toward antidiscrimination claims.91 Based on his four-decade career in employment
discrimination litigation, Judge Mark W. Bennett acknowledges that “the federal
judiciary has become increasingly unfriendly towards employment
discrimination cases going to trial.”92 This unfriendliness or hostility is most
evident at the appellate level where summary judgment dismissals are
overwhelmingly affirmed and verdicts for the anti-discrimination plaintiff are
reversed more frequently than any other substantive area of federal law.93
2.

The Consequences of “Only Procedural” Rulings

Early rulings on procedural threshold issues—such as summary judgment—
can be outcome determinative, requiring a court to make substantive predictions
about the merits of the case.94 Through these procedural rulings, “more and
more courts are weighing evidence, evaluating the credibility of claims and
witnesses, and substituting their normative judgments for a jury’s

87. Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in
Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 127 (2009).
88. See, e.g., Kerri Lynn Stone, Shortcuts in Employment Discrimination, 56 ST. LOUIS L.J.
111, 112 (2011); Gertner, supra note 32, at 109 (“Federal courts, I believed, were hostile to
discrimination cases. Although the judges may have thought they were entirely unbiased, the
outcomes of those cases told a different story.”).
89. See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1941
(1998); see also Gertner, supra note 32, at 109 (“One judge after another insisted that there was no
hostility. All they were doing when they dismissed employment discrimination cases was
following the law—nothing more, nothing less.”).
90. See Gertner, supra note 87, at 2–3.
91. See Stone, supra note 90, at 112.
92. Mark W. Bennett, From the “No Spittin’, No Cussin’ and No Summary Judgment” Days
of Employment Discrimination Litigation to the “Defendant’s Summary Judgment Affirmed
Without Comment” Days: One Judge’s Four Decade Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 685, 697
(2013).
93. See Clermont, supra note 88, at 108–14.
94. Elizabeth M. Schneider & Nancy Gertner, “Only Procedural”: Thoughts on the
Substantive Law Dimensions of Preliminary Procedural Decisions in Employment Discrimination
Cases, 57 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 767, 768 (2012).
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determination.”95 As a result, these “only procedural” determinations have
effectively revised the substantive law “through the back door.”96
Typically turning on nuances of intent, disparate treatment cases are factually
complex. Because few employers openly admit to acts of intentional
discrimination, plaintiffs must prove intent with circumstantial evidence, which
rarely stands uncontested.97 Nonetheless, the majority of employment
discrimination cases end in summary judgment because trial courts improperly
evaluate the merits of the case by weighing the credibility of the evidence. As a
result, employment discrimination defendants enjoy greater success with
summary judgment in federal court than defendants in any other substantive area
of federal law.98
Judge Nancy Gertner describes this phenomenon as “Losers’ Rules,”
suggesting that “asymmetrical decisionmaking” may be responsible for this
trend.99 When a judge grants summary judgment, typically for the defendant, an
opinion is written.100 When summary judgment is denied, on the other hand, the
case simply proceeds to trial without a written opinion discussing why summary
judgment was denied.101 She explains that over time, “[i]f case after case recites
the facts that do not amount to discrimination, it is no surprise that the
decisionmakers have a hard time envisioning the facts that may well comprise
discrimination.”102
3.

Conservativism: The Anti-Discrimination Plaintiff Bias

Although asymmetrical opinion writing provides one plausible reason for the
anti-discrimination plaintiff’s plight in federal court, Judge Gertner notes that
standing precedent “hardly compels” courts to continue this practice.103 She
suggests that the phenomenon may also be ideologically driven by
conservativism.104 Conservativism in the judiciary refers to a practice where
cases are decided based on either a political philosophy or a judicial
philosophy.105
When a “conservative judge” is guided by a political philosophy, key policy
issues before the court are decided in a manner consistent with the conservative

95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See Gertner, supra note 32, at 113.
98. See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 89, at 109–13, 131–32.
99. Gertner, supra note 32, at 110.
100. Id. at 113–15.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 115.
103. Id. at 113.
104. Id. at 112.
105. Michael Kinsley, What Is a Conservative Judge?, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 12, 2010),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/04/what-is-a-conservative-judge/38786/.
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political agenda.106 Although both Democratic and Republican presidents have
appointed judges likely to make decisions that are consistent with their political
agendas,107 conservative appointments have been criticized as hostile to civil
rights. For example, as President Reagan filled an unprecedented number of
vacancies on the federal bench with conservative appointments,108 critics
accused the Reagan appointees of “chipping away at protections against race and
sex discrimination . . . and turning the federal clock back to earlier policies.”109
Decisions of politically conservative judges are informed by the belief that
employment discrimination is over because society has evolved into a post-

106. Id. (asserting that such individuals are those “who will vote to overturn Roe v. Wade”).
107. See generally Graeme Browning, Reagan Molds the Federal Court in His Own Image, 71
ABA J. 60 (1985) (comparing President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s appointments of Justices to
the Supreme Court to the judicial appointments of President Reagan).
108. Id. at 61 (“The Constitution gives the president the power to make judicial appointments,
conservative legal scholars say, so it is not only reasonable but expected that his choices will reflect
his policies.”).
109. Id. at 60–61 (noting that despite the Reagan Administration’s claims that politically
conservative judges were merely applying the law, the nomination and confirmation processes
served to ensure the appointment of ideologically homogenous judges who were skeptical of
governmental responses to past racial discrimination and fervent supporters of free-market
economic theories). In January of 2017, President Donald Trump fulfilled his campaign promise
to fill the Supreme Court vacancy left by the passing of Justice Antonin Scalia with Neil Gorsuch,
a staunch conservative justice. In the wake of Justice Scalia’s death, Senate Republicans refused
to hold hearings for any justice nominated under President Obama to prevent what “would have
likely given the Court’s liberal wing its first five-justice majority since the Warren Court of the
1960s.” Matt Ford, Trump Nominates Neil Gorsuch for the U.S. Supreme Court, THE ATLANTIC
(Jan. 31, 2017, 8:50 PM), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/01/gorsu
ch-trump-supreme-court/515232/. Following the successful appointment of Neil Gorsuch to the
Supreme Court, Republican leaders have aggressively sought to manipulate the judicial branch by
filling vast numbers of vacancies on the federal bench with conservative judges. See Carl Hulse,
Trump and McConnell See a Way to Make Conservatives Happy, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/17/us/politics/trump-mcconnell-judicial-nominees.html
(“Stymied legislatively, President Trump and Senator Mitch McConnell are turning their attention
to one way they can skirt Democratic roadblocks and mollify unhappy Republicans—by filling
scores of federal court vacancies.”); see also Charlie Savage, Trump Is Rapidly Reshaping the
Judiciary.
Here’s
How.,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
11,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/11/us/politics/tru
mp-judiciary-appeals-courts-conservatives.html (“Republicans are systematically filling appellate
seats they held open during President Barack Obama’s final two years in office with a particularly
conservative group of judges with life tenure.”).
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racial,110 post-gender reality111 and that the market is bias free,112 despite
substantial evidence to the contrary.113
“Judicial conservativism,” on the other hand, refers to “a strong belief in the
principle of stare decisis, or respect for precedent.”114 The inherent issue with
this judicial philosophy arises when cases within a substantive area have
inconsitent holdings. For example, “[d]oes that mean that a conservative judge
must rule in favor of upholding all of the liberal rulings of the 1960s and 1970s?
Even though many of them overturned earlier precedent?”115
Determining which conservativism guides the federal judiciary is of little
consequence to the anti-discrimination plaintiff because evidence of bias against
him remains. Indeed, courts often trivialize—even outright ignore—evidence
of explicit bias.116
II. ORTIZ-DIAZ V. HUD: ESCAPING A STIFLING MATERIALITY STANDARD
As discussed above, the analytical confusion in lower federal courts unjustly
prevents an increasing number of disparate treatment cases from reaching trial
by imposing heavier burdens on plaintiffs. A recent case from the D.C. Circuit,

110. Cf. Tanzina Vega, Working While Brown: What Discrimination Looks Like Now, CNN
MONEY (Nov. 25, 2015, 12:04 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/11/25/news/economy/racialdiscrimination-work/index.html; Dedrick Muhammad, Racial Equality In and Out of the
Workplace,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Aug.
29,
2013,
10:38
AM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/dedrick-muhammad/racial-equality-in-and-ou_b_3836508.html
(offering an example of disparate treatment faced by Ecuadorian workers who were barred from
eating lunch in the workroom).
111. Cf. Leach v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 128 F. Supp. 3d 146, 156–57 (D.D.C. 2015)
(claiming sex discrimination under Title VII).
112. Schneider & Gertner, supra note 96, at 776.
113. See generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias,
“Science,” and Antidiscrimination Law, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 477 (2007) (arguing that
antidiscrimination laws should account for the unconscious biases that lead to gender-based and
racial disparities); Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More
Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94
AM. ECON. REV. 991, 1006–07 (2004) (finding that employers uniformly discriminated against
applicants with “African American sounding” names during the hiring process despite the
applicants being equally qualified as applicants with “White” names); see also Julie Creswell &
Tiffany Hsu, Women’s Whisper Network Raises Its Voice, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/04/business/sexual-harassment-whisper-network.html
(reporting on how social media has enabled women to come together and discuss the instances of
gender-based discrimination they have experienced in their workplaces); Rebecca Hiscott, White
People Think One Black Person’s Success Proves Racism Is Over, HUFFINGTON POST (June 10,
2014, 9:54 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/06/10/racism-success-study_n_5474
419.html (“[R]ecent Supreme Court decisions made under the assumption that racial discrimination
is a thing of the past suggest this view is already having potentially disastrous consequences.”).
114. Kinsley, supra note 109.
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., discussion infra Part II.
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Ortiz-Diaz v. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD),117
illustrates the plight of the disparate treatment plaintiff and the eagerness of the
courts to narrow the scope of Title VII.
The facts of the case involve the denial of a transfer request allegedly based
on the plaintiff’s race and national origin. Although the D.C. Circuit initially
affirmed summary judgment for the defendant, the sharply divided panel
vehemently disagreed on whether the Circuit’s materiality standard barred the
court from recognizing the denial of the plaintiff’s transfer request as “materially
adverse.”118 A year later—while the plaintiff sought review en banc—the
original three-judge panel “decided sua sponte to reconsider the case and
vacated its decision.”119 It is appropriate, then, to look at Ortiz-Diaz as a stark
example of the injustice resulting from the analytical confusion in disparate
treatment jurisprudence.
A.

Facts of the Case

Samuel Ortiz-Diaz, a Hispanic man born in Puerto Rico, began his
employment with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development,
Office of Inspector General (HUD OIG), as a criminal investigator in San Juan,
Puerto Rico in 1998.120 In 2000, Ortiz-Diaz was reassigned to Hartford,
Connecticut, to be closer to his wife with whom he lived in Albany, New
York.121 In 2009, Ortiz-Diaz accepted a promotion to senior special agent in
HUD OIG’s headquarters in Washington, D.C.. His wife, however, remained in
Albany, where the couple maintained the home they owned.122
At headquarters, Assistant Inspector General John McCarty, although not
Ortiz-Diaz’s immediate supervisor, was the senior manager charged with
making personnel decisions that directly affected him.123 For example, McCarty
was the ultimate decision-maker regarding employee promotions and the
approval or denial of transfer requests within HUD OIG. In fact, McCarty had
previously exercised his transfer authority over Ortiz-Diaz in 2005.124 Despite
their protests, McCarty involuntarily transferred Ortiz-Diaz and an African
American investigator to assist with Hurricane Katrina relief efforts in
Mississippi, which was regarded as “a hardship assignment.”125 Notably, non117. Ortiz-Diaz v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 831 F.3d 488 (D.C. Cir. 2016), aff’g 75
F. Supp. 3d 561 (D.D.C. 2014), vacated, 867 F.3d 70 (D.C. Cir. 2017). Throughout this Note, the
2016 decision by the D.C. Circuit will be labeled as Ortiz-Diaz I and the 2017 decision as OrtizDiaz II.
118. Ortiz-Diaz I, 831 F.3d at 494–500 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring & Rogers, J., dissenting).
119. Ortiz-Diaz II, 867 F.3d at 71.
120. Ortiz-Diaz I, 831 F.3d at 490.
121. Id.
122. Ortiz-Diaz II, 867 F.3d at 72.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Brief for Appellant at 7 n.4, Ortiz-Diaz I, 831 F.3d 488 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (No. 15-5008).
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minority investigators who similarly protested were not forced to take the
hardship assignment to Mississippi.126
Working at headquarters placed Ortiz-Diaz in close proximity to McCarty,
where he noticed that McCarty exhibited discriminatory attitudes toward
minority employees.127 Specifically, McCarty made racially disparaging
comments about Hispanics in the workplace such as, “Where is the hired help?”
and called any individual who appeared to be Hispanic by the same name or by
the names of other Hispanic employees, claiming that Hispanics “all look
alike.”128 McCarty was also the subject of an inordinate number of
discrimination complaints.129
Based on McCarty’s discriminatory conduct and a suspicion that he harbored
racial animus, Ortiz-Diaz grew concerned “that his career would suffer if he
remained in close proximity to McCarty at headquarters.”130 He began seeking
transfer opportunities to work in regions he believed better positioned him for
advancement within HUD OIG.131 As a privilege of employment, HUD OIG
offered a voluntary transfer program, whereby employees could request a
transfer to duty stations of their choice for reasons other than specific staffing
needs at no cost to the government.132 Although request approvals were not
guaranteed, the program had a history of generously enabling non-minority
employees to transfer between offices, with HUD OIG even creating new
positions to facilitate those transfers in some instances.133
After communicating with the Region 2 (New York) Special Agent in Charge
Rene Febles, Ortiz-Diaz learned of important, high-profile work needing the
attention of a capable agent in Albany.134 Febles invited Ortiz-Diaz to consider
filling that position, telling him that although there were no regularly stationed
investigators in the Albany office, “it would be acceptable for Ortiz-Diaz to
work either from his Albany home or from the Department’s Albany office.”135
Shortly thereafter, Ortiz-Diaz also learned of a vacancy announcement in
Hartford, Connecticut.136 Hoping to enhance his promotion opportunities, OrtizDiaz approached his immediate supervisors to request transfers to either Albany
126. Ortiz-Diaz further alleged that while he was working in Mississippi, “he learned several
investigators volunteered for the transfer there and his involuntary transfer was unnecessary.” Id.
127. Id. at 6–7.
128. Ortiz-Diaz II, 867 F.3d at 72.
129. Brief for Appellant, supra note 128, at 7.
130. Ortiz-Diaz II, 867 F.3d at 72.
131. Id. at 72–73.
132. In fact, the HUD OIG policy mandated that the no cost transfer program be administered
without regard to race, sex, color, national origin, age, or disability. Ortiz-Diaz I, 831F.3d 488, 494
(D.C. Cir. 2016) (Rogers, J., dissenting).
133. Litigation later revealed that “McCarty was involved in each of those decisions.” OrtizDiaz II, 867 F.3d at 73.
134. Brief for Appellant, supra note 128, at 8.
135. Ortiz-Diaz II, 867 F.3d at 73.
136. Brief for Appellant, supra note 128, at 8.
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or Hartford, but they advised him to make the requests with McCarty directly.
McCarty, in turn, summarily denied both requests.137
Notably, shortly before denying Ortiz-Diaz’s transfer request, McCarty
approved the transfer request of a white female special agent from Hartford,
Connecticut, to the Boston, Massachusetts, office because she planned to marry
a Boston police officer.138 Rather than filling the vacant special agent position
in Hartford with Ortiz-Diaz, McCarty filled the vacancy with another white
female special agent notwithstanding the fact that her supervisor—an African
American employee who had previously complained of McCarty’s racial
animus—objected to the transfer.139
Believing that his transfer requests were denied because of his race and
national origin, Ortiz-Diaz filed a disparate treatment claim in federal district
court.140 The government, with discovery disputes pending, moved for summary
judgment on the grounds that Ortiz-Diaz suffered no adverse employment
action, and the district court agreed.141 Because Ortiz-Diaz never alleged a loss
in “pay, supervisory responsibilities, or job opportunities as result of the
[transfer] denials,” the court determined that the challenged action was based on
the denial of “a purely lateral transfer,” which required a showing of a materially
adverse consequence.142 Concluding that Ortiz-Diaz failed to offer anything
“beyond his own speculation” that transfer would have bettered his career
opportunities, the court found that Ortiz-Diaz could not survive the summary
judgment challenge.143
Despite Ortiz-Diaz’s unresolved “motion to compel ‘full and complete
responses’ to his discovery requests relating to potential comparators,” the court
granted summary judgment in favor of the government.144 Judge Royce
Lamberth saw “no further need for discovery” because the information sought
would not defeat summary judgment, positing that
even if Mr. Ortiz-Diaz uncovered . . . evidence that all white
employees were granted voluntary transfers while all non-white white
employees were refused them, that discriminatory statements were
rampant, that dozens of complaints had been lodged—it would not
alter the conclusion that the denial of a lateral transfer was not an
adverse employment decision.145
137. Id. at 9.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Ortiz-Diaz v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 75 F. Supp. 3d 561, 563 (D.D.C. 2014).
141. The government moved for summary judgment shortly after Ortiz-Diaz filed a motion to
compel discovery, but the district court postponed settling the discovery dispute until resolution of
the dispositive motions. Id. at 567–68.
142. Id. at 565.
143. Id. at 567.
144. Ortiz-Diaz I, 831 F.3d 488, 495 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Rogers, J., dissenting).
145. Ortiz-Diaz, 75 F. Supp. 3d at 568.
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Ortiz-Diaz I: Immunizing Discrimination

On appeal, D.C. Circuit Judge Karen LeCraft Henderson affirmed the district
court’s grant of summary judgment.146 Citing the “materially adverse” standard
as the legal standard for adverse employment actions in the D.C. Circuit, Judge
Henderson concluded that, despite undisputed evidence of racial animus, OrtizDiaz failed to show that he suffered sufficient harm to warrant the resolution of
his claim on the merits at trial.147
Judge Henderson characterized Ortiz-Diaz’s claim of “material adversity” as
a mere “dissatisfaction with the lack of reassignment,” adding that he offered
only a “bare assertion” that his career opportunities were “tangibly injured”
based on a “belief that his promotion outlook would look rosier” under a
different supervisor.148 Ortiz-Diaz’s “dissatisfaction,” she reasoned, constituted
only a subjective injury for which no legal remedy existed.149 She dismissed
Ortiz-Diaz’s purported adversity as simply the loss of a “preference” not to work
under a discriminatory supervisor and quipped, “If such a declaration were
sufficient to raise a jury issue, our materiality requirement would be an empty
vessel indeed.”150
Curiously enough, however, Judge Henderson also filed a concurring opinion
solely to take issue with “a disturbing hypothetical” posed in oral argument by
Ortiz-Diaz’s counsel.151 Judge Henderson fervently rejected Counsel’s
contention that, in accepting the government’s argument, the D.C. Circuit
“would affirm dismissal of a suit challenging an employer’s affixing a ‘whitesonly’ sign to a water cooler because ‘not a penny is lost by any worker . . . no
one lost supervisory duties . . . [and it is] not in any way related to the actual
workplace.”152 She dismissed the argument entirely as bearing “no relevance”
to the D.C. Circuit precedent for the “materially adverse” standard.153
In a separate concurrence, Circuit Judge Brett Kavanaugh agreed with the
affirmance of summary judgment for the government because, in his view, the
majority opinion “faithfully” followed D.C. precedent that lateral transfers “are
ordinarily not” adverse employment actions.154 Still, he filed a concurring

146. Ortiz-Diaz I, 831 F.3d at 490.
147. Id. at 492.
148. Id. at 491–92.
149. Judge Henderson cites Forkkio v. Powell, 306 F.3d 1127, 1130–31 (D.C. Cir. 2002), as
the controlling authority, which stands for the proposition that “purely subjective injuries” such as
“dissatisfaction with a reassignment” do not constitute adverse actions, while “purely subjective
harms” such as “reassignment with significantly different responsibilities” do. Ortiz-Diaz I, 831
F.3d at 491–92.
150. Ortiz-Diaz I, 831 F.3d at 492.
151. Id. at 493–94 (Henderson, J., concurring).
152. Id. (Henderson, J., concurring) (alteration in original).
153. Id. (Henderson, J., concurring).
154. Id. at 494 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
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opinion because the injustice of dismissing Ortiz-Diaz’s claim did not sit well
with him. He explained:
I write this concurrence simply to note my skepticism about those
cases. In my view, a forced lateral transfer—or the denial of a
requested lateral transfer—on the basis of race is actionable under
Title VII. Based on our precedents, however, I join the majority
opinion.155
Circuit Judge Judith Rogers, on the other hand, held nothing back in her
scathing dissent, proclaiming: “Once again the court returns to the issue of the
proper role of the district court at summary judgment but this time stumbles
badly.”156 After briefly noting that HUD OIG’s no cost, voluntary transfer
program was a “privilege of Ortiz-Diaz’s employment,” she began her reproach
of the majority’s affirmance by listing the evidence in the record.157
Citing the Circuit’s decision in Stewart v. Ashcroft,158 Judge Rogers
emphasized that material adversity could be satisfied by providing evidence that
the challenged conduct curtailed the plaintiff’s future career opportunities.159
She contended that Ortiz-Diaz cleared the material adversity hurdle because
sufficient evidence in the record existed to meet this standard.160 Starting with
Ortiz-Diaz’s sworn declaration that identified and explained the career
opportunities he stood to gain by the approval of his transfer requests, she then
turned to the evidence of McCarty’s more favorable treatment of whiteemployee comparators. After highlighting the corroborating accounts of
McCarty’s racial animus in the workplace, she closed her review of the record
by pointing to the list of discrimination complaints launched against McCarty.161
In Judge Rogers’ view, the majority plainly misapplied the summary
judgment standard when nothing in the adverse employment action
jurisprudence supported otherwise.162 She concluded, “The court, although
acknowledging that a ‘lateral transfer with increased promotion prospects might
qualify’ as an adverse action, avoids this conclusion only by improperly
discounting Ortiz-Diaz’s sworn declarations.”163 In the wake of Ortiz-Diaz I, an
employer in the D.C. Circuit could openly base its decision to make or deny

155. Id. (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
156. Id. (Rogers, J., dissenting).
157. Id. (Rogers, J., dissenting).
158. 352 F.3d 422 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
159. Ortiz-Diaz I, 831 F.3d at 495–96 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (citing Stewart, 352 F.3d at 426–
27).
160. Id. at 496–97 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
161. Id. (Rogers, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 495–96 (Rogers, J., dissenting). She added that both the First and Seventh Circuits
also recognized actions that impaired employment opportunities as adverse employment actions.
Id. at 496.
163. Id. at 497 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
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lateral transfers on the employee’s race or national origin so long as the resulting
injury remained sufficiently “subjective” to that employee.
C. Ortiz-Diaz II: A Shot Across the Bow
Following the affirmance of summary judgment, Ortiz-Diaz filed a petition
for rehearing en banc on September 16, 2016.164 Eleven months later, “[b]efore
that petition was resolved, the original three-judge court decided sua sponte to
reconsider the case and vacated its decision.”165 Concluding that nothing in the
D.C. Circuit’s Title VII precedent barred Ortiz-Diaz from proceeding to trial and
that he provided sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment, the court
reversed and remanded the case to the district court.166
Writing the opinion for the court, Judge Rogers began her analysis by
invoking the language of Title VII, calling attention to its primary objective to
“achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have
operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other
employees.”167 She then provided the historical context that led to the passage
of Title VII:
Title VII was enacted at a time when racially and ethnically biased
supervisors left employees with two options: (1) quit their jobs,
imperiling their ability to work and survive economically, or (2)
endure the discrimination, and the attendant economic and
professional toll it inflicted. Congress created a third option by
empowering employees to demand equal treatment . . . .168
Thus, Ortiz-Diaz’s claim that he was discriminatorily denied transfer away from
a racially and ethnically biased supervisor landed squarely “within Title VII’s
heartland,” and nothing in the D.C. Circuit precedent held otherwise.169
Noting that although the denial of a lateral transfer ordinarily does not
constitute an adverse employment action under circuit precedent, the court made
clear that “a showing of ‘consequences affecting . . . future employment
opportunities’ could be sufficient” to meet the materiality standard,170 Judge
Rogers found that the Circuit lacked precedent directly on point because, beyond
the lateral transfer context, nothing in the Circuit’s precedent bore any
resemblance to the “career-stifling transfer denials of which Ortiz-Diaz
complained.”171

164. Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Ortiz-Diaz I, 831 F.3d 488 (No. 15-5008).
165. Ortiz-Diaz II, 867 F.3d 70, 71 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 74 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975)).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. (quoting Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 446, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).
171. Id. at 74–75 (“In other words, under our Title VII precedent, Ortiz-Diaz’s Title VII claims
involve far more than a mere dislike of McCarty, see Forkkio v. Powell, 306 F.3d 1127, 1132 (D.C.
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Given the particular facts of the case, Ortiz-Diaz’s “burden to show harm
arising from diminished career prospects [was] necessarily rooted in
probabilities.”172 In other words, the stronger the evidence of McCarty’s racial
and ethnic bias, the higher the probability that remaining in headquarters with
McCarty would have materially harmed his career. Thus, the fundamental
question was whether Ortiz-Diaz provided sufficient evidence to allow a
reasonable juror to find that “transfer away from McCarty to Febles’ supervision
would have improved his career prospects.”173
Judge Rogers held that the district court committed a “fundamental error of
law” when it discredited Ortiz-Diaz’s sworn declarations as “his own
speculation” because the declarations provided “objective, non-conclusory
statements of fact.”174 Citing several cases from the D.C. Circuit, Judge Rogers
made clear that “the declarations alone provided sufficient competent evidence”
to “render summary judgment inappropriate” in Ortiz-Diaz’s case.175
Furthermore, the court found that Ortiz-Diaz’s proffered letter from a former
co-worker alleging similar observations of McCarty’s racial and ethnic bias,
coupled with the government’s acknowledgment of other discriminatory
complaints lodged against McCarty, corroborated Ortiz-Diaz’s contention that
McCarty fostered a discriminatory work environment.176 Thus, evidence
showing that McCarty’s personnel decisions were rooted in racial and ethnic
bias, by extension, strengthened the inference that the denials of transfer away
from McCarty resulted in materially adverse consequences for Ortiz-Diaz.177
Acknowledging that some evidence in the record cut against Ortiz-Diaz’s
claim, Judge Rogers reminded the court that its “role at summary judgment is
not to find facts in lieu of a jury, particularly not against the non-moving
party.”178 Rather, the court is solely tasked with determining “whether sufficient
evidence exists for a reasonable jury to find in Ortiz-Diaz’s favor, i.e., that
McCarty did harbor such a bias.”179
Concurring in the judgment, Judge Henderson agreed that a genuine issue of
material fact existed for trial but took issue with the “unwise” approach of the
majority.180 According to Judge Henderson, the critical question centered on
whether HUD OIG’s no-cost transfer program constituted a legally protected

Cir. 2002), or a ‘subjective preference’ to work for Febles in Albany, Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d
446, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1999).”).
172. Id. at 75.
173. Id. at 75–76.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 76.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 77.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 77–78 (Henderson, J., concurring in the judgment).
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“privilege” of employment.181 Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Hishon
v. King and Spalding, Judge Henderson acknowledged that the “terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment” clause of Title VII should be
interpreted broadly.182 “It can apply to everything from a security clearance, to
a bonus, to eligibility for election to a law firm’s partnership,” she added.183
Therefore, “in light of the particular features of HUD’s no-cost transfer program
and its potential to aid Ortiz-Diaz’s professional development,” she agreed that
the case should proceed to trial.184
Nonetheless, Judge Henderson remained deeply unsettled by the majority’s
holding, charging that her colleagues “cherry-pick[ed] the factual record” to
conclude that the denial of transfer away from McCarty was itself actionable
under Title VII.185 Denouncing the majority’s review of the evidence, she
criticized that “they reach[ed] back twelve years” to consider McCarty’s
decision to impose the temporary hardship assignment to Mississippi, yet
ignored the fact that it was McCarty who subsequently approved Ortiz-Diaz’s
promotion to special agent.186 She also pointed out that “McCarty worked to
find Ortiz-Diaz a different comparably attractive job” after awarding a position
in New York for which Ortiz-Diaz applied to another Hispanic employee.187
In Judge Henderson’s reading of the record, McCarty’s “discriminatory bent
[wa]s, at most, slight.”188 She remained skeptical of the majority’s reliance on
Ortiz-Diaz’s sworn declaration, arguing that the law surrounding the sufficiency
of a sworn declaration at summary judgment was “hardly as clear as [the
majority] suggest[ed].”189 Finding that “McCarty’s alleged bias was hardly selfevident,” she concluded that she “would wait for a claim with more ‘objectively
tangible harm’” before narrowing the precedent on lateral transfers.190
Judge Rogers issued a concurring opinion to address the case’s
unconventional procedural history. Pleased with the court’s reversal, she
acknowledged its significance and projected, “Perhaps our reconsideration will
serve as a shot across the bow that courts in this Circuit must adhere to the
summary judgment standard and not prematurely reject evidence that a jury
could reasonably credit.”191 Admittedly doubtful that such a result would occur,
she added, “[O]ne can only marvel at Ortiz-Diaz’s escape from our otherwise
181. Id. at 78–79 (Henderson, J., concurring in the judgment).
182. Id. at 79 (Henderson, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Hishon v. King & Spalding,
467 U.S. 69, 75 (1984)).
183. Id. (Henderson, J., concurring in the judgment) (internal citations omitted).
184. Id. at 78–79 (Henderson, J., concurring in the judgment).
185. Id. at 79 (Henderson, J., concurring in the judgment).
186. Id. (Henderson, J., concurring in the judgment).
187. Id. (Henderson, J., concurring in the judgment).
188. Id. (Henderson, J., concurring in the judgment).
189. Id. at 79 n.4 (Henderson, J., concurring in the judgment).
190. Id. at 79–80 (Henderson, J., concurring in the judgment).
191. Id. at 80 (Rogers, J., concurring).
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stifling materiality standard . . . . I fear that the next plaintiff, alleging a similar
wrong, may not be as fortunate.”192 She concluded with a call for a definitive
solution to the injustice:
Therefore, it remains long past time for the en banc court to join its
sister circuits to make clear that transfers denied because of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin are barred under Title VII . . . and that
any action by an employer to deny an employment benefit on such
grounds is an adverse employment action under Title VII.193
Judge Kavanaugh issued a concurring opinion to join Judge Roger’s call to
action.194 Referencing the uncertainty surrounding “the line separating transfers
actionable under Title VII from those that are not,” he urged the en banc court
to definitively establish that all discriminatory transfers, or denial of requests for
transfer, constitute adverse employment actions under Title VII.195 In his view,
such conduct “plainly constitutes discrimination with respect to ‘compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment’ in violation of Title VII.”196
III. AN ANALYTICAL NIGHTMARE LEADS TO AN UNJUST REALITY
Ortiz-Diaz I illustrates, as many legal scholars argue, how today’s disparate
treatment jurisprudence diametrically opposes both the letter and spirit of Title
VII. The D.C. Circuit initially denied Ortiz-Diaz a judicial remedy and
effectively left McCarty free to maintain “a policy that, notwithstanding a
concrete opportunity for professional advancement, no Hispanics need apply for
the no-cost transfer program” at HUD OIG.197 Judge Rogers highlights this
anomaly in her admonishment of the majority opinion, deriding, “Yet no court
could condone that result.”198 How, then, do federal courts reconcile this
paradox?
To answer this question, we must first examine Title VII’s requirement of an
adverse employment action. The statute is completely void of such language.199
Lower federal courts point to the “terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment” clause of Section 703(a)(1) as the authority for the adverse
employment action requirement.200 However, in Hishon, the Supreme Court
interpreted that language as an expansive concept, encompassing any benefits
192. Id. at 80–81 (Rogers, J., concurring).
193. Id. at 81 (Rogers, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted).
194. Id. at 81 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
195. Id. (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
196. Id. (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
197. Ortiz-Diaz I, 831 F.3d 488, 498 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Rogers, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 498 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
199. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”).
200. See discussion supra Section I.B.2.
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that result from an employment relationship. The Court explicitly instructed, “A
benefit that is part and parcel of the employment relationship may not be doled
out in a discriminatory fashion, even if the employer would be free under the
employment contract simply not to provide the benefit at all.”201
It is no coincidence that Judge Rogers’ dissent in Ortiz-Diaz I cited Hishon
when she reminded the court that “[the no-cost transfer] program was a privilege
of Ortiz-Diaz’s employment.”202 Likewise, Judge Henderson found—albeit
only upon reconsideration in Ortiz-Diaz II—that the no-cost transfer program
“could qualify as a ‘privilege’ of [Ortiz-Diaz’s] employment [under Hishon],
raising a genuine issue of fact for jury resolution.”203 So, if both Judge Rogers
and Judge Henderson agree that the denial of an employment privilege amounts
to an adverse employment action, then what explains all “[t]he ink that has been
spilled over the course of [Ortiz-Diaz’s] appeal”?204
The lower courts imported the adverse employment action into the “terms,
conditions, or privileges” clause, in large part, out of a desire for judicial
economy.205 Indeed, proponents of the adverse employment action argue that
without a sustainability threshold, discrimination claims based on “every
workplace slight” would overwhelm the courts.206 Even accepting that the
adverse employment action may be necessary, setting the bar at “materially
adverse” results in manifestly unjust consequences.207 As evidenced by OrtizDiaz I, the D.C. Circuit “so finely parsed” the adverse employment action
requirement “that two judges initially concluded [the materially adverse action
precedent] barred [Ortiz-Diaz] from a judicial remedy.”208
The panel relied heavily on Stewart v. Ashcroft,209 which clarified Brown v.
Brody,210 the D.C. Circuit’s seminal case on lateral transfers, in both Ortiz-Diaz
I and Ortiz-Diaz II to reach opposite conclusions. In Brown, the D.C. Circuit
201. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 75 (1984).
202. Ortiz-Diaz I, 831 F.3d at 494 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
203. Ortiz-Diaz II, 867 F.3d 70, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Henderson, J., concurring in the
judgment).
204. Ortiz-Diaz II, 867 F.3d at 80 (Rogers, J., concurring).
205. See Russell v. Principi, 257 F.3d 815, 818 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Rogers, J.) (“[N]ot everything
that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action. . . . We take no issue with the
‘objectively tangible harm’ requirement, which guards against both ‘judicial micromanagement of
business practices’ and frivolous suits over insignificant slights.” (internal citations omitted)).
206. See, e.g., Taylor v. FDIC, 132 F.3d 753, 765 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“The federal courts cannot
be wheeled into action for every workplace slight, even one that was possibly based on protected
conduct.”); Williams v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 270, 274 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Otherwise
every trivial personnel action that an irritable, chip-on-the-shoulder employee did not like would
form the basis of a discrimination suit.”).
207. See, e.g., Ortiz-Diaz I, 831 F.3d 488, 491 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Henderson, J.) (“Under our
Circuit precedent the action complained of must be ‘materially adverse’ to support a discrimination
claim.” (citing Ginger v. District of Columbia, 527 F.3d 1340, 1343 (D.C. Cir. 2008))).
208. Ortiz-Diaz II, 867 F.3d at 80 (Rogers, J., concurring).
209. 352 F.3d 422, 426 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
210. 199 F.3d 446 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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defined lateral transfers as “one in which [the plaintiff] suffers no diminution in
pay or benefits,” holding that neither the involuntary imposition nor denial of a
lateral transfer amounted to an adverse employment action unless “some other
materially adverse consequences affecting the terms, conditions, or privileges of
[the plaintiff’s] employment or her future employment opportunities [existed,]
such that a trier of fact could conclude that the plaintiff has suffered objectively
tangible harm.”211
Four years after Brown, the D.C. Circuit revisited the issue of lateral transfers
in the context of Title VII in Stewart v. Ashcroft.212 In Stewart, the plaintiff,
who worked as Senior Litigation Counsel for the Department of Justice, filed a
disparate treatment action against his employer after “two separate incidents in
which white candidates were selected over him” to serve as Chief.213 The district
court determined that Stewart’s non-selections amounted to denials of lateral
transfer, rather than non-promotion, because transitioning from Senior Litigator
to Chief amounted to no difference in pay or benefits.214 Accordingly, to make
a prima facie under Brown, the court required that Stewart show a “tangible
employment action evidenced by firing, failing to promote, a considerable
change in benefits, or a reassignment with significantly different
responsibilities.”215 Finding Stewart’s desire to become Chief as “mere
idiosyncrasies of personal preference,” the district court determined that Stewart
suffered no material consequences and granted summary judgement for the
government.216
On appeal, the circuit court agreed that Stewart’s non-selection amounted to
the denial of a lateral transfer and was therefore subject to the holding in
Brown.217 Analyzing the facts under the framework of Brown, the circuit court
emphasized that “[t]he remaining language of Brown suggests that there are
lateral transfers that could be considered adverse employment actions.”218 In the
court’s view, transitioning from Senior Litigation Counsel to Chief meant an
advancement within the hierarchy of the organization, notwithstanding the fact
that pay and benefits remained the same. Thus, denying Stewart such an
opportunity for advancement resulted in “‘materially adverse consequences [for]
the terms, conditions, or privileges’ of [his] employment.”219
Like the plaintiff in Stewart, the denial of Ortiz-Diaz’s transfer requests
resulted in the denial of opportunities for advancement. Indeed, Ortiz-Diaz
provided objective statements—which the government never disputed—about
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id. at 457.
Stewart, 352 F.3d at 423–24.
Id. at 423.
Id. at 426.
Stewart v. Ashcroft, 211 F. Supp. 2d 166, 173 (D.D.C. 2002).
Id. at 175–76 (quoting Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 446, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).
Stewart, 352 F.3d at 426.
Id.
Id. at 426–27.
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the professional benefits he expected to gain had his transfer requests not been
denied.220 In Ortiz-Diaz I, no one disputed that Stewart controlled or that OrtizDiaz attributed his transfer requests to increased promotion prospects. Yet, the
case resulted in a majority opinion that found no adverse employment action,
two concurring opinions, and a dissent.
Ortiz-Diaz I chose the path of most resistance to determine that no material
adversity existed. Perhaps this is a manifestation of Gertner’s Losers’ Rules
theory, where an abundance of case law detailing what material adversity is not
has left the majority hard-pressed to envision a set of facts that do meet the
“materially adverse” standard.221 After all, Judge Henderson made an elaborate
effort to discuss all the ways that lateral transfers fail to meet the materiality
standard under D.C. Circuit precedent.222 Despite his “skepticism” of the result,
Judge Kavanaugh joined in the majority opinion solely “because it faithfully
follow[ed] [D.C. Circuit] precedents.”223
Granted, the “asymmetric decisionmaking” of the Losers’ Rules theory may
be a contributing factor that led to the analytical confusion in Ortiz-Diaz I.224
But, as Judge Rogers pointed out in Ortiz-Diaz II, nothing in the Circuit’s lateral
transfer precedent bore any “resemblance to the adversity Ortiz-Diaz faced” by
remaining under the thumb of McCarty’s alleged racial animus.225 Thus,
perhaps an ideology rooted in conservativism also contributed to the unfortunate
results in Ortiz-Diaz I.
Indeed, Judge Kavanaugh’s principled belief in stare decisis compelled him
to compromise his personal objections to racially oppressive conduct in the
workplace.226 Noting his skepticism, he proceeded to deprive Ortiz-Diaz of a
judicial remedy due to case law that regards lateral transfers as “ordinarily not
changes in the ‘terms, conditions, or privileges’ of employment.”227 In
concurring with the majority, Judge Kavanaugh woefully conflated “are
ordinarily not” with “are never.”
220. Ortiz-Diaz I, 831 F.3d 488, 496–97 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Rogers, J., dissenting) (“Ortiz-Diaz
proffered evidence not merely that he would be more satisfied working in Albany or Hartford, but
that he would be better positioned to advance within the Inspector General’s Office.”).
221. See Gertner, supra note 32, at 115 (“If case after case recites the facts that do not amount
to discrimination, it is no surprise that the decisionmakers have a hard time envisioning the facts
that may well comprise discrimination.”).
222. Ortiz-Diaz I, 831 F.3d at 491–93 (Henderson, J.).
223. Ortiz-Diaz I, 831 F.3d at 494 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
224. See Gertner, supra note 32, at 113–15.
225. Ortiz-Diaz II, 867 F.3d 70, 75 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Rogers, J.) (“But the relatively minor,
attenuated harms rejected as a matter of law in Forkkio and Russell are a far cry from the careerstifling transfer denials of which Ortiz-Diaz complained.” (citing Forkkio v. Powell, 306 F.3d 1127
(D.C. Cir. 2002); and Russell v. Principi, 257 F.3d 815 (D.C. Cir. 2001))).
226. Ortiz-Diaz I, 831 F.3d at 494 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“In my view, a forced lateral
transfer—or the denial of a requested lateral transfer—on the basis of race is actionable under Title
VII.”).
227. Id. (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (emphasis added).

602

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 67:575

Or perhaps Ortiz-Diaz I was guided by the conservative belief that
employment discrimination is over, that society has evolved into a post-racial,
post-gender reality and that the market is bias-free.228 Indeed, throughout both
her majority opinion in Ortiz-Diaz I and her concurrence in Ortiz-Diaz II, Judge
Henderson makes no attempt to hide her skepticism of McCarty’s racial bias.
Although she accuses the majority in Ortiz-Diaz II of “cherry-pick[ing] the
factual record,” she reads the record in such a way that allows her to conclude
that McCarty’s “discriminatory bent is, at most, slight.”229 She comes to this
conclusion despite the government’s acknowledgment that McCarty had been
the subject of an inordinate number of discrimination complaints and despite a
letter by another HUD OIG employee that corroborated the accounts of
McCarty’s discriminatory conduct.
Instead, she mocks the majority for “reach[ing] back twelve years” to credit
McCarty’s decision to impose the hardship assignment to Mississippi on OrtizDiaz. She also discredited the allegation of McCarty’s racial bias by
emphasizing that it was McCarty who approved Ortiz-Diaz’s promotion to
headquarters. Moreover, the evidence revealed that McCarty had awarded the
position in New York “to another employee—who, again, was Hispanic.” Thus,
in Judge Henderson’s view, “McCarty’s alleged bias was hardly self-evident.”
However, her reproach of the majority’s analysis in Ortiz-Diaz II makes no
mention of the white comparators who McCarty permitted to use the no-transfer
program freely.
No matter how you slice it, both Ortiz-Diaz I and Ortiz-Diaz II substantiate
the claim of judicial hostility toward the anti-discrimination plaintiff in federal
court. Ultimately, the reasoning behind the hostility is irrelevant when the
resulting injustice is undeniable. Although Ortiz-Diaz managed to escape the
“otherwise stifling materiality standard,” the next anti-discrimination plaintiff
“may not be as fortunate.”230
Without resolving this paradox, fundamental principles of equality and justice
will exist only in theory as federal courts continue to increase the burdens on
anti-discrimination plaintiffs. Once again, government-sanctioned oppression
will be the reality in this country as the courts effectively broaden the scope of
permissible discrimination. This bar to justice contradicts both the plain
language of Title VII and Supreme Court precedent. Therefore, the D.C. Circuit
should resolve this paradox by heeding Judge Rogers’ advice and joining its
sister circuits in holding that: (1) transfers denied on any impermissible basis are
barred under Title VII, and (2) the denial of any employment benefit on
impermissible grounds is an adverse employment action under Title VII.
228. See Schneider & Gertner, supra note 95, at 776.
229. Ortiz-Diaz II, 867 F.3d at 79 (Henderson, J., concurring in the judgment)
230. Ortiz-Diaz II, 867 F.3d at 80–81 (Rogers, J., concurring). On remand to district court, the
parties reached a settlement agreement and dismissed the case. Order Adopting Stipulation of
Dismissal at 1, Ortiz-Diaz v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., No. 1:12-cv-00726-RCL (D.D.C.
Apr. 11, 2018), ECF No. 40.
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IV. CONCLUSION
What set out to be the “embodiment of this Nation’s basic posture of common
sense and common justice”231 has been reduced to a hollow vessel that
immunizes discriminatory conduct in the workplace. The existence of this trend
has been well documented for decades, yet federal courts continue to whittle
away the protections designed to safeguard equality and justice. Regardless of
whether it is ideologically driven by conservativism or merely the by-product of
advances in judicial economy, the resulting injustice is undeniable.
The inconsistency in disparate treatment jurisprudence among the federal
circuits has yielded an analytical confusion that acts as a court-sanctioned barrier
to equal employment opportunity in this country. The Supreme Court should
seek the opportunity to restore the aims of the Civil Rights Act by making it
clear that impermissible motivation alone will render the denials of any
employment benefits or lateral transfers as actionable under Title VII. In the
words of a legislator who helped pass the Civil Rights Act, “[W]e should insist
that this law be a reality, and not merely something on the statute books which
is ignored and not put into effect.”232

231. John F. Kennedy, Special Message to the Congress on Civil Rights and Job Opportunities
- June 19, 1963, 1963 Pub. Papers 483, 493 (1963).
232. 110 CONG. REC. 14,448, 14,449 (1964) (statement of Sen. Paul Douglas).
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